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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2006 and 2007 the state of Oregon conducted a groundbreaking mileage fee pilot
program. The program responded to a national concern that fuel taxes will stop serving
as a reliable revenue source as a large proportion of the vehicle fleet transitions to
running on little or no petroleum-based fuel. To prepare Oregon for this future threat to its
transportation revenues, the state legislature authorized a pilot program to test mileage
fees as a replacement for the state fuel tax.

THE STUDY DESIGN
This study examines the interactions between urban form and drivers’ responses to the
Oregon mileage fee program, using data from 130 households participating in the program.
The analysis compares the program’s impact on vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in different
locations and at different times for households charged with two different fee structures:
• Peak-Charged households, who paid a fee of 10 cents per mile during peak hours
in the region’s congested zone but a fee of only 0.43 cents per mile for all other
mileage within Oregon.
• Flat-Rate households, who paid a flat fee of 1.2 cents per mile for all mileage within
Oregon.

THE STUDY FINDINGS
The analysis focused on testing four hypotheses. These, along with the key results, are
as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Peak-Charged households will reduce their VMT during high-cost times
more than will Flat-Rate households.
Peak-Charged households did, as expected, reduce their driving during high-cost
times more than did the Flat-Rate households. Charging a noticeably higher fee for
driving in congested conditions successfully achieved the goal of inducing households
to reduce their VMT in those times and places where congestion is most a problem.
Hypothesis 2: Peak-Charged households will increase travel in the off-peak time period,
and/or at all times outside the peak-charge zone, as compensation for reducing their travel
during the peak hour within the peak-charge zone.
Contrary to this hypothesis, there were no detected spillover effects to off-peak weekday
hours or to areas in Oregon outside the peak-charge zone. The results about spillover
effects to weekends and to areas outside the state of Oregon were inconclusive. The
lack of evident spillover may result from conditions specific to the Portland region,
including the urban growth boundary (UGB) in Portland, which limits the presence of
travel destinations outside the urban area.
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Hypothesis 3: Given a sufficient incentive to reduce driving, households in denser, mixeduse, and transit-accessible neighborhoods are more likely to reduce their VMT than would
households in other types of neighborhoods.
The findings confirm this hypothesis for Peak-Charged households. Density and a
mix of land uses were statistically significantly correlated with reduced VMT of several
types, suggesting that when the travel cost increases in peak hours, households in
denser and mixed-use neighborhoods are able to reduce their VMT more than those
who do not live in these neighborhoods.
The models also suggest that the urban form effects on Flat-Rate households are quite
different from the effects on Peak-Charged households. For a Flat-Rate household,
density and mixed-use tended to encourage, not discourage, driving. A possible
explanation for this surprising finding is presented in the main text of the report.
Hypothesis 4: Replacing the gas tax with a mileage fee reinforces the influence of urban
form on households’ travel patterns, perhaps because such a fee establishes a stronger
and more prominent connection between travel cost and travel distance than does a gas
tax.
The study results mostly confirm this hypothesis. The introduction of the peak charge
enhanced the influence of urban form on several types of household VMT. Also, for all
types of VMT the urban form variables had a greater influence on the Peak-Charged
households than on the Flat-Rate households.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The study results suggest various implications for transportation policymakers, including
the following five:
1. Charging a noticeably higher fee for driving in congested conditions can successfully
motivate households to reduce their VMT in those times and places where congestion
is most a problem.
2. Households in all types of neighborhoods studied will likely reduce their peak-hour
and overall travel under a mileage fee program that charges a high-rate for peakhour travel, though households in higher-density neighborhoods with a mix of land
uses will likely make greater reductions in VMT.
3. A mileage fee program that charges a high rate during the peak hour will likely
strengthen the underlying influence of urban form on travel behavior, as compared
to the current gas tax system. In other words, urban form patterns will affect travel
behavior more than they currently do if the nation shifts to a new system of mileage
charges that vary by congestion levels. For planners, this finding suggests that
switching from fuel taxes to mileage taxes would strengthen the power of landuse planning as a policy tool to shift some travel from solo driving trips to more
sustainable modes. Also, this finding about the link between urban form and travel
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behavior in response to a mileage fee implies that mileage-fee program designers
will need to carefully consider both current and future urban form patterns when
estimating the likely revenues collected from mileage fees and also the impact the
fees could have on congestion levels.
4. The study findings suggest that residents in lower-density suburban areas, as well
as residents in higher-density and more mixed-use neighborhoods, are able to
reduce their driving in response to a mileage fee. Therefore, the results add new
empirical evidence to the ongoing equity debate about whether mileage fees are
unfair to households living in suburban communities, and suggest that this concern
may not be warranted.
5. Although a peak-hour mileage charge could encourage drivers to think carefully
about their travel decisions and they would probably reduce their VMT accordingly,
the ultimate program outcomes will likely depend on the specific program design,
especially when and how the mileage fee is paid. If the payment is made less
frequently than the current system of gas taxes charged at the pump, such as
through a monthly billing program, drivers might increase instead of decrease their
VMT because they would be less aware of the cost of their travel.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006 and 2007 the state of Oregon conducted a groundbreaking mileage fee pilot
program. The program responded to a national concern that fuel taxes will stop serving as
a reliable revenue source as a large proportion of the vehicle fleet transitions to running on
little or no petroleum-based fuel. To prepare Oregon for this future threat to its transportation
revenues, the state legislature authorized a pilot program to test mileage fees that could
potentially replace the state fuel tax. The pilot tested both a flat-rate fee that was the same
for any mile driven, and also a variable fee structure that charged drivers a higher fee for
miles driven during the rush hour.1
Since the pilot ended, researchers have examined many facets of the program’s success,
including the performance of the technology and ways that drivers changed their travel
behavior once they were paying the flat-rate and variable mileage fees rather than the
gas tax. One crucial aspect of the behavioral response that has not yet been well studied,
however, is whether people’s behavioral responses to the mileage fees are correlated with
any elements of the urban form around their homes. The term urban form is defined broadly
to include land use patterns, such as density and mixed use, urban form measures, such as
location in a metropolitan region and street connectivity, and accessibility to public transit.
This study addresses that research gap by exploring three specific research questions:
• Does urban form correlate with any of the travel behavior changes that participants
made in response to the Oregon mileage fee pilot program?
• Which urban form factors are most significant in explaining travel behavior variations?
• Do the effects of urban form differ under the two fee structures tested: the flat-rate
fee and the variable fee with a higher rate during the peak periods?

THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
Both federal and state policymakers are currently studying mileage fees as a serious
option for replacing or supplementing fuel taxes, and a growing number of transportation
finance experts believe that mileage fees are the future of transportation financing and
congestion pricing.2 Internationally, mileage fee programs have already been established
for trucks in Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Germany, and the Netherlands
was, until recently, planning to implement the first ever nationwide mileage fee system
for all vehicle types. Within the United States, numerous other states, including Hawaii,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Florida, Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Texas, have also
expressed an interest in phasing out fuel taxes in favor of charging motorists for how much
they drive.
Given this intense interest in mileage fees, and the likelihood that a number of such
programs will be tested and perhaps established in the upcoming decade, the need for
a better understanding of behavioral responses is important. This study’s results join the
small but rapidly expanding body of empirical studies that seek to understand the benefits,
potentials, and concerns of a mileage fee program. In particular, the study complements
Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e
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the existing research by using empirical analysis to explore a question previously almost
untested: the link between urban form and behavioral responses to mileage fees.
Investigating whether urban form influences behavioral responses to the mileage fees has
various important research and policy implications. Most important, urban form patterns
might prove the key to better explaining the observed behavioral responses to the mileage
fee program. We hypothesized that urban form, which has been mostly overlooked by prior
studies, could significantly affect a household’s response to a mileage fee program and
should be taken into account in program design and evaluation.
Understanding the relationship between mileage fees and urban form will help researchers
and policymakers more accurately predict outcomes, including the effect of a mileage
fee on VMT and revenue in different locations. Such analysis can also inform the equity
discussions that arise whenever mileage fee programs are proposed. A common concern
is that switching from fuel taxes to a mileage fee program will penalize residents in lowdensity communities, since they have fewer transit options and nearby destinations than
residents of more urban communities and thus might have a more difficult time reducing
VMT. Looking at the Oregon data allows us to add real-world evidence to a debate that
has, so far, largely been conducted without any particular empirical evidence.

EXISTING RESEARCH ON MILEAGE FEE PROGRAMS
Despite worldwide interest in mileage fees as a possible replacement for fuel taxes, very
little research has been done to understand how applying a mileage fee to all travel might
influence travel behavior. In the United States, there have been just a handful of pilot mileage
fee programs that provided usable data for analysis. Along with the Oregon project that
is the focus of this report, the Minnesota Department of Transportation and Puget Sound
Regional Council (PSRC) tested experimental mileage-fee programs in 2006 and 2007,
and the Netherlands ran a road pricing experiment for six months in the city of Eindhoven.
(The University of Iowa is also currently conducting a national field test and evaluation of
a mileage fee program.) Given the scarcity of data on how users have responded to realworld mileage fee programs, a few researchers have also developed models using survey
data or travel diary data to predict how people might respond to mileage fees charged on
all their travel.3
Previous empirical studies confirmed a great variation in behavioral responses in both
Oregon4 and Minnesota,5 but they have failed to explain most of the variation. For
example, only 6% of the VMT changes in the Oregon pilot were explained by household
characteristics, access to transit, and personal attitudes. We hypothesize that urban
form such as density, land use diversity, and proximity to different types of transportation
facilities, which have been overlooked in most previous research, could significantly affect
a household’s response to a mileage fee program and should be taken into account in
future program design and evaluation.
To date, research has looked at only two different connections between urban form and
behavioral responses to mileage fee programs. First, Rufolo and Kimpel analyzed the

Mineta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Introduction

7

Oregon pilot program data and found that close proximity to a transit stop was correlated
with greater reductions in VMT with the mileage fee.6
A second connection that has been explored involves differences between urban and
rural areas. This connection responds to equity concerns, raised because rural residents
usually have to travel farther for work and personal needs and have fewer transit and
nonmotorized transportation options than residents in more urban communities.7 One
group of authors has written two papers using modeling of 2001 NHTS data to estimate
the cost to drivers of a mileage tax versus a fuel tax that would both raise the same total
revenues for Oregon.8 The authors conclude that a shift to a VMT fee yields the opposite
result for rural residents from what conventional wisdom suggests. With a revenue-neutral
VMT fee, a rural household on average would pay less than under a traditional gas tax,
mostly because of the lower average fuel efficiency in most rural vehicles, as compared to
the urban fleet.

OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT
The remaining sections of this report cover three main topics:
The section titled “Study Methodology” describes the operational details of the 2006-2007
Oregon Road User Fee Pilot that are relevant to the data analysis presented here, and
discusses the methodology and data used for the analysis.
The section titled “Analysis and Findings” presents the analysis conducted for this study.
The chapter begins by presenting a series of four hypotheses and the analyses completed
to test each one. The discussion ends with additional modeling work conducted to explore
some puzzling results.
Finally, the section titled “Conclusion” summarizes the key findings from the data analysis
and suggests some policy implications, as well offering suggestions for future research
into the interaction between mileage fee programs and urban form.
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STUDY METHODOLOGY
THE OREGON MILEAGE FEE PILOT PROGRAM
In 2006 and 2007 the state of Oregon conducted a groundbreaking mileage fee pilot
program in response to a concern that fuel taxes would eventually cease to provide
sufficient transportation revenues as an increasing percentage of the vehicle fleet began to
run on little or no petroleum-based fuel. This section of the report discusses the design of
the Oregon program, the socioeconomic characteristics of the participants, and the survey
and vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) data collected.

The Program Design
Oregon’s Mileage Fee Pilot Program tested two types of experimental fees: a flat-rate
VMT fee that approximated the price of the state gas tax, and a fee whose rate varied by
the time of day and location. The latter system imposed a high peak-hour fee for driving in
the Portland metropolitan area during specific times of the day, paired with a low fee for all
miles driven outside the metropolitan area and/or outside the peak hours. The primary goal
of the pilot program was to test whether the technology to track vehicle mileage and charge
the appropriate fees to drivers would work, but the program also collected mileage and
survey data that have made it possible to investigate how the program affected household
driving behavior.
Oregon DOT recruited participants in the spring of 2006 through press releases, an
informational website, and radio and print advertising. Volunteers were initially screened
by telephone and then asked to attend an evening sign-up meeting.9 In the end, 168
households with 207 vehicles were enlisted to participate in the program, which ran for a
ten-month period from 2006-2007.10
All vehicles in participating households were outfitted with Global Positioning System
(GPS) devices designed to record the participants’ driving behavior. The participants also
agreed to purchase gasoline at two specific service stations at regular intervals, and the
mileage data was transferred from the vehicles to the program managers each time gas
was purchased from these two stations. A third requirement for participants was that they
complete a survey on three separate occasions: before the program (June 2006), midway
through the program (October-November 2006), and at the end of the program (MarchApril 2007). The surveys gathered information on household characteristics and travel
decisions made during the program.
Most of the participating households were located in the eastern portion of the metropolitan
region, likely because that’s where the two gasoline stations participating in the study were
located (Figure 1). Large portions of the suburbs east of downtown Portland were developed
prior to World War II, resulting in neighborhoods today that have a greater mix of land
uses, a finer-grained grid street network, and higher densities with better transit service.
However, neighborhoods farther from downtown, including those close to the participating
gas stations, do not exhibit many of these traditional urban form characteristics. As a result,
there is significant variation among the participating households with respect to urban form
characteristics that might influence travel behavior.
Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e
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Figure 1.

Study Methodology

Residential Locations of the 130 Study Participants Used in the MTI Analysis

Source: Map prepared by Melissa Reese using data from the Oregon Department of Transportation and Metro’s
Regional Land Information System (RLIS).

The program was broken into two phases. In Phase 1, a 4.5-month control phase, the
households paid the regular state gas tax, so there was no program-based incentive for
them to change their regular driving behavior. The VMT was recorded for all the participating
vehicles to establish baseline driving behavior for that vehicle. In Phase 2, which lasted for
5.5 months, participants were broken into three groups, each of which paid a different type
of tax or fee on gasoline purchases:
Control group: Members of the small Control group (approximately 10% of the participating
households) continued to pay the regular state gas tax, though the data from their miles
driven was recorded when they fueled up at the participating gas stations.
Flat-Rate group: Members of the Flat-Rate group did not pay the state gas tax, but were
instead charged a VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile for all miles driven within Oregon. This
rate was chosen to approximate the 24-cent-per-gallon state gas tax. In other words, the
rate was set so that participants would pay about the same amount in VMT fees that they
would otherwise pay in state gasoline taxes. Participants did not pay the mileage fee for
travel outside of Oregon, nor did they receive refunds on taxes paid on gas purchased
outside of the state.
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Peak-Charged group: Members of the Peak-Charged group paid a higher VMT fee of
10 cents per mile for all driving inside the Portland urban growth boundary (UGB) during
the peak periods (7 to 9 AM and 4 to 6 PM, Monday through Friday, excluding holidays).11
For other travel within Oregon during the peak hour, as well as for travel within the UGB
at off-peak times, they paid only 0.43 cents per mile. As with the Flat-Rate group, these
households did not pay a mileage fee for travel outside of Oregon, nor did they receive
refunds on taxes paid on gas purchased outside of the state.
Households were not randomly assigned among the three groups. Instead, the program
managers assigned participants to a group using a designated set of rules. First, if the
household owned one or more ineligible vehicles (i.e., diesel vehicles or cars bought
before 1996), then it was assigned to the Control group. Households that failed to regularly
purchase their gas at one of the two designated service stations during Phase 1 were also
placed in the Control group. The remaining vehicles were divided between the Flat-Rate
and Peak-Charged groups according to how many miles they drove within the UGB during
peak hours. For households that regularly traveled in the UGB during peak hours, three
were placed into the Peak-Charged group for every one placed in the Flat-Rate group.12
As a result, only one-third of the Flat-Rate households typically traveled within the UGB
during peak hours, while the number of Peak-Charged group participants who didn’t use
the congestion zones in their daily travel was kept to a minimum.13
Households received special receipts each time they purchased gas at one of the two
participating service stations (see Figure 2). These receipts showed participants the money
they “saved” by not paying the gas tax, how much money they were charged in mileage
fees, and how many miles they had driven in four different categories since last refueling
at one of the participating service stations: miles charged the peak rate, other miles in
Oregon, miles driven outside Oregon, and miles for which the GPS device did not record a
location. The participants in the two experimental groups were also able to submit receipts
in January and March of 2007 and receive refunds on the gas tax for gasoline purchased
at non-participating service stations within Oregon.
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Figure 2. Sample Mileage Fee Receipts
Source: James M. Whitty, Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program: Final Report (Oregon
Department of Transportation, November 2007), p. 20.

Another piece of the charging structure in Phase 2 was that members of both experimental
groups received so-called “endowment accounts” with which to pay their mileage fees.
These accounts were given to the participating households at the beginning of Phase 2,
and all mileage fees charged to them were deducted from these accounts.
Each household’s endowment account was set at a level that was estimated to be slightly
higher than would be needed to cover the mileage fees the household would pay if it
continued to drive in its Phase 1 patterns.14 Therefore, if a household’s driving pattern
remained the same in both phases, its endowment account would almost balance out to
zero at the end of the experiment. The average amount of money placed in the endowment
accounts was $51.50 for a Flat-Rate household and $123.20 for a Peak-Charged household.
Participants were told the amount of their endowment account at the beginning of Phase
2 of the experiment, but were not informed of how it was calculated. They received notice
from ODOT about the balance in their account every few weeks but could not track the
balance in real time. Households were told that if there was any balance left in their account
at the end of the program, they could keep that money.15 This element of the program was
designed to create an incentive for households to reduce their VMT. Finally, ODOT did not
hold households responsible for paying the mileage fees if they ran out of money in the
endowment account, though households were not told this.16
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THE PARTICIPANTS
A total of 183 households participated in the pilot program. For the analysis conducted in
this report, however, that group was reduced for the reasons detailed in Table 1. After all
these exclusions, the end result was a sample of 130 households, with 62 in the Flat-Rate
group and 68 in the Peak-Charged group.
Table 1.

Households Excluded from the Analysis in the MTI Study

Reason for exclusion

Number excluded

Valid VMT data was not captured

15

Home address could not be geocoded in GIS

17

Household was located outside the urban growth boundary

2

Household bought or sold a vehicle during the program

12

Household had at least one car not enrolled in program

19

Household had highly unusual VMT patterns: i.e., had an unusually high average daily VMT per vehicle in Phase 1 (more than 100
miles a daya) or had a change of 40 miles or more in average daily
VMT per vehicle from Phase 1 to Phase 2

7

Control Group households that did not pay any form of mileage fee
in Phase 2

8

Note: Some households were excluded for multiple reasons.
a
We suspect that such households may have done long-distance driving atypical of their daily routines, such as crosscountry travel, and therefore should be excluded from this analysis.
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Table 2.

Socio-Demographic and Structural Characteristics of the Participant
Households
Households in MTI analysis,
by group
All households in the All households Peak-Charged
Flat-Rate
ODOT pilot in the MTI analy- households households
(n=183)
sis (n=130)
(n=68)
(n=62)

Drivers in HH
1

62%

61%

59%

63%

2

37

38

40

37

3

1

1

1

0

1

68

70

69

71

2

29

26

29

23

3

3

4

1

6

4

1

0

0

0

1

46

47

46

48

2

46

45

46

45

3

6

5

6

5

4

1

2

3

0

5

1

1

0

2

28

28

32

24

Full-time employee ≥1)

71

68

78

58

Only part-time employees

10

10

6

15

Only unemployed

16

20

15

26

2

2

1

2

< $40K

33

37

29

45

$40-60K

36

37

40

34

> $60K

27

26

31

21

Vehicles in HH

Adults in HH (16+ years)

Child in HH (≥1)
Employment in HH

Only full-time students
HH Income

Note: Percentages within each category may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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THE DATA: SURVEY DATA, TRAVEL DATA, AND URBAN FORM MEASURES
• Mileage within Portland UGB during the AM peak, PM peak, and non-peak on each
of the five weekdays (5 x 3 = 15 types)
• Mileage within Oregon but outside the Portland UGB in the peak and off-peak hours
on each of the five weekdays (5 x 2 = 10 types)
• Mileage on Saturday and Sunday inside Portland UGB, plus weekend mileage
outside Portland UGB but inside Oregon (2 x 2 = 4 types)
• Mileage outside Oregon for all days (1 type)
• Mileage driven where the GPS signal could not be read (1 type)
After the full set of 96 variables had been defined, two processes were followed to refine
this large set into a small number of the most appropriate variables for use in the models.
First, for all variables looking at the same factor at different scales, simple regression
models were estimated to select the most appropriate spatial scale. Only the scale
that yielded the highest adjusted R2 value was included in the final model specification.
Adjusted R2 indicates the goodness-of-fit of the model, the higher the better. Second,
correlations among variables were tested, and when variables were correlated only the
one that achieved the highest R2 value was retained.
Completing these two steps resulted in nine urban form measures: five measured
accessibility, one measured density, one measured land-use mix, and the final two
measured street pattern and cycling infrastructure. Table 3 describes how each of the
variables was defined and the sources of data used to construct them.
In addition to testing the urban form variables, we also included in the model one program
variable related to the pilot study design: the network distance to the two designated
refill gas stations. This variable was included in the models to check whether the location
of these two gas stations could have affected participants’ behavioral response to the
program, especially for those who lived farther away from the stations. Since participants
had to use the stations periodically during the study, living far away from the stations might
have influenced their driving patterns.
Household-level demographic variables were created using the survey data. These
variables included the number of drivers, the number of vehicles, the number of adults,
the presence of children, employment status, and income. In addition, each household’s
“Phase 1 base VMT,” or the household’s average daily VMT per vehicle during Phase 1, is
also included in the analysis.
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Description/operation

Urban Form Variables Used in the Study Modeling

Definition

RLIS Bus Stops shapefile

Table 3.
Category
•
•
•
•

Network distance to
closest freeway exit
(miles)

Network distance
to Portland’s UGB
(miles)

Network distance to
downtown (miles)

• Exported the freeway ramps from the major arterial shapefile.
• Converted the ramps that were lines into points representing the point of entry on the highway.
• Used the network analyst tool to find the minimum network distance between each household and the closest freeway entry ramp.

•
•

•
•

Created points for all places where the UGB intersects a major arterial road.
Found the network distance to closest point using ESRI’s network analyst closest facility operation.

Defined downtown as a single downtown point, Pioneer Courthouse Square.
Calculated the network distance using ESRI’s network analyst closest facility operation.

U.S. Census 2000

RLIS Major Arterial Streets shapefile

RLIS UGB shapefile

Geocoded one point for downtown
based on the location of Pioneer
Courthouse Square

Data source

Access
Network distance to
frequent bus stop
(dummy variable;
0.25-mile buffer)
• 0 = no light rail stops within 0.5 miles, by network distance
• 1 = network distance is less than 0.5 miles

RLIS Light Rail Stops shapefile (minus the light rail stops added in 2009
after the study, which took place from
Oct. 2007 to Sept 2008)

Density of residential
units within 0.5-mile
buffer (residential
units per acre)

• Calculated the land area within a 0.5-mile buffer of each study household, then subtracted the area of all bodies of water in the buffer zone.
• For all block groups within 0.5 mile of a study household, calculated the percentage of each block group’s land area that lies within the buffer.
• Allocated the corresponding percent of the block groups’ residential units to each buffer and found the sum of the estimated residential units within the
0.5-mile buffer, based on the percentage of each block group in the study area.
• Found the density of residential units within each buffer based on the estimated number of units and the calculated land area within the 0.5-mile buffer
zone around each study household.
• (Method follows Forsyth, Section 3.6.b)

Entropy {–∑k[(pi)(ln pi)]}/(ln k)

• The Entropy Index is a measure of land use homogeneity. The formula is:

RLIS streets shapefile

where k= number of land use categories and pi = Proportions of each of the six land-use types.
• Seven land-use categories were used: single family residential, multi-family residential, commercial, vacant, public, other, and industrial.
• The study area was a 0.5-mile buffer around each household.
• (Method follows Forsyth, Section 5.9.c)

•
•
•
•
•

RLIS bike routes shapefile

Entropy Index
(captures 7 land-use
types)

RLIS tax lot shapefile
(Scale 0 to 1: value of 0 indicates
homogeneity, wherein all land uses
are of one type; a value of 1 indicates
complete heterogeneity, wherein
all land-use categories are evenly
distributed)

0 = no stops within 0.25 miles, by network distance
1 = network distance to stop is less than 0.25 miles
Frequent bus = with a headway less than 15 minutes
(Method follows Rufulo and Kimpel.a)

Network distance
to light rail stop
(dummy variable;
0.5-mile buffer)

Density

Mixed
use

Street
connectivity
4-way intersection
density within 0.5mile buffer (intersections per acre)

• Calculated the total length of bike routes and multi-use paths within a 3-mile buffer of each household.

Created intersections for all streets within a 0.5-mile buffer of each study household.
Selected only the intersections within the 0.5-mile buffer of each household, to eliminate the false intersections created at the edge of the 0.5 mile buffer.
Found all intersections that represented points where 3 or more street-line segments converge (vs. cul-de-sac end points and points where streets bend).
Calculated the number of intersections divided by the area of each 0.5-mile buffer around the study households (area excluding water).
(Method follows Forsyth, Section 6.6 d)

Bike lane length
within 3-mile buffer
(feet)

a
Anthony M. Rufolo and Thomas J. Kimpel, “Responses to Oregon’s Experiment in Road Pricing,” Transportation Research Record 2079 (2008): 1-7.
b
Ann Forsyth, ed, Environment and Physical Activity: GIS Protocols (Minneapolis, MN: Design Center, 2007), Version 3.6, Section 6.6, http://www.designforhealth.net/resources/gis_protocols.html.
Ann Forsyth, ed, Environment and Physical Activity: GIS Protocols, (Minneapolis, MN: Design Center, 2007), Version 5.9, Section 6.6, http://www.designforhealth.net/resources/gis_protocols.html.
	Ann Forsyth, ed, Environment and Physical Activity: GIS Protocols, (Minneapolis, MN: Design Center, 2007), Version 6.6, Section 6.6, http://www.designforhealth.net/resources/gis_protocols.html.
c
d
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
We tested four hypotheses to understand the effect of the pilot program on VMT changes, as
well as the interaction between urban form and the mileage fees. The first two hypotheses
look at how each household’s daily VMT may have varied between Phase 1 and Phase 2:
Hypothesis 1: Peak-Charged households will reduce their VMT during high-cost times
more than will Flat-Rate households.
Hypothesis 2: Peak-Charged households will increase travel in the off-peak time period,
and/or at all times outside the peak-charge zone, as compensation for reducing their
travel during the peak hour within the UGB (the peak-charge zone).
The next two hypotheses assess the interaction between urban form and the mileage fee
program:
Hypothesis 3: Given a sufficient incentive to reduce driving, households in denser,
mixed-use, and transit-accessible neighborhoods are more likely to reduce their VMT
than would households in other types of neighborhoods.
Hypothesis 4: Replacing the gas tax with a mileage fee reinforces the influence of
urban form on households’ travel patterns because such a fee establishes a stronger
and more prominent connection between travel cost and travel distance than does a
gas tax.
After presenting the findings for each hypothesis, this chapter ends with a discussion of how
the program design, especially the endowment accounts, may have affected participants’
response to the program.

EXPLORING THE VARIATION IN VMT BETWEEN PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2
To investigate the nuances of how VMT varied between the two phases of the pilot program,
as well as between the Flat-Rate households and Peak-Charged households, we looked at
seven different measures of VMT, consolidated from the 31 types available in the original
data set. The unit for all seven measures is the average daily VMT per household vehicle
in a participating household.
1. Portland Weekday Peak: The average daily VMT per household vehicle inside the
Portland urban growth boundary (UGB) during peak hours (7 to 9 AM and 4 to 6 PM).
2. Portland Weekday Off-Peak: The average daily VMT per household vehicle inside
the Portland urban growth boundary (UGB) but in the off-peak hours (before 7 AM,
between 9 AM and 4 PM, and after 6 PM).
3. Oregon Low-Fee Weekday: The sum of Portland Off-Peak VMT and the VMT
outside the UGB but still inside Oregon.
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4. Oregon Weekday: The average daily VMT per household vehicle for all weekday
travel within Oregon.
5. Oregon Weekend: The average daily VMT per household vehicle on weekends
and holidays everywhere in Oregon, including within the Portland UGB.
6. Outside Oregon All Days: The average daily VMT per household vehicle outside
Oregon on all days of the week (weekdays, weekends, and holidays).
7. Overall: The average daily VMT per household vehicle inside and outside Oregon
on all days of the week (weekdays, weekends, and holidays).

Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the descriptive statistics of the seven types of VMT, in
Phase 1 and Phase 2, for both Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households. Peak-Charged
households drove more than Flat-Rate households in Phase 1, a distinction caused by the
selection process described in the previous section. Most types of VMT decreased from
Phase 1 to Phase 2 except the Portland Weekday Peak for Flat-Rate households, which,
surprisingly, increased by 18%. This increase might be caused by the pilot program design,
especially the endowment account that essentially exempted participants from paying the
gas tax or the mileage fee. This issue will be discussed again at the end of the chapter.
Note that the Oregon Weekend and Overall VMT decreased dramatically from Phase 1
to Phase 2 for both household groups, with the two groups showing similar percentage
changes. This similarity in behavior between the two groups indicates that the reduction
might not be caused by the pilot program. We suspect that the reduction resulted from a
seasonal change in travel patterns. It is well documented that total monthly VMT in the U.S.
tends to be higher in the summer than in the winter.19 Also, data from nine traffic monitoring
stations20 on the main highway intersections in the Portland metropolitan indicated that
for the five-month period from November to March 2007 (roughly the months of Phase
2), average monthly VMT is 7% lower than for the months from June to October in 2006
(roughly the months of Phase 1). Later in the chapter we use the difference-in-difference
method to control for this seasonal change.
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Average Daily VMT per Household Vehicle for the Flat-Rate Households,
for Different Categories of Travel, by Phase (n=62 HHs)
Average
Miles

%

Median
Standard
Deviation Miles

%

Minimum
(miles)

Maximum
(miles)

Portland Weekday Peak
Phase 1 (P1)

4.6

3.7

3.3

0.7

19.2

Phase 2 (P2)

5.3

4.3

3.9

0.9

18.7

Difference (P2 – P1)

0.6

2.2

0.3

-5.1

8.3

18

12

Portland Weekday Off-Peak
Phase 1

14.2

6.2

13.9

4.3

36.7

Phase 2

14.2

6.6

12.8

3.5

36.1

4.0

-0.2

-12.1

10.9

Difference (P2 – P1)

0.01

3

-1

Oregon Low-Fee Weekday
Phase 1

18.0

8.1

16.8

6.6

41.8

Phase 2

16.8

8.6

16.1

3.5

40.6

Difference (P2 – P1)

-1.2

5.4

-1.9

-12.1

16.5

-4

-13

Oregon Weekday
Phase 1

22.6

9.8

20.7

8.8

52.6

Phase 2

22.2

10.8

21.2

4.4

53.6

Difference (P2 – P1)

-0.5

6.6

-2.2

-11.7

21.2

-1.0

-10

Oregon Weekend
Phase 1

35.5

14.4

37.9

8.9

77.0

Phase 2

26.4

15.1

22.4

7.2

59.4

Difference (P2 – P1)

-10.8

10.9

-10.0

-33.5

23.9

-27

-31

Outside Oregon All Days
Phase 1

2.8

4.1

1.3

0.0

21.8

Phase 2

1.7

4.8

0.2

0.0

36.1

5.0

-0.4

-21.8

24.9

Difference (P2 - P1)

-1.1

-28

-68

Overall
Phase 1

28.1

12.3

26.8

9.0

58.7

Phase 2

24.4

12.7

22.5

7.4

80.6

Difference (P2 – P1)

-3.7

8.2

-3.9

-27.3

23.3

-12

-18
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Table 5.

Average Daily VMT per Household Vehicle for the Peak-Charged Households, for Different Categories of Travel, by Phase (n=68)
Average
Miles

%

Median
Standard
Deviation

Miles

%

Minimum Maximum
(miles)
(miles)

Portland Weekday Peak

Phase 1

8.7

5.7

6.7

3.2

36.3

Phase 2

7.7

6.1

6.6

0.0

32.3

3.0

-0.4

-10.7

9.4

Difference (P2 - P1)

-1.1

-13

-7

Portland Weekday Off-Peak
Phase 1

17.1

7.4

15.6

5.3

39.5

Phase 2

16.7

8.9

15.7

3.1

48.4

Difference (P2 - P1)

-0.3

4.7

-0.3

-12.1

16.2

-2

-2

Oregon Low-Fee Weekday
Phase 1

21.5

9.8

21.0

5.3

53.5

Phase 2

18.9

9.2

19.9

3.1

48.9

Difference (P2 - P1)

-2.6

6.1

-3.3

-24.5

13.1

-10

-18

Oregon Weekday
Phase 1

30.0

11.9

28.2

8.9

67.5

Phase 2

26.6

11.5

25.2

6.4

56.6

Difference (P2 - P1)

-3.6

6.8

-3.5

-26.7

7.4

-11

-12

Oregon Weekend
Phase 1

49.2

22.8

46.9

9.2

80.1

Phase 2

33.2

16.4

31.6

1.2

74.6

17.0

-13.8

-77.5

8.8

Difference (P2 - P1)

-16.0

-28

-28

Outside Oregon All Days
Phase 1

3.5

4.1

1.8

0.0

19.8

Phase 2

2.7

4.9

0.6

0.0

22.5

4.7

-0.5

-13.3

18.7

Difference (P2 - P1)

-0.8

-56

-57

Overall
Phase 1

37.7

14.3

35.2

13.3

74.9

Phase 2

31.3

11.8

30.5

9.1

56.3

Difference (P2 - P1)

-6.4

9.0

-6.5

-34.4

10.1

-15

-18
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THE EFFECT OF THE MILEAGE FEE ON VMT CHANGES
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1: Peak-Charged households will reduce their VMT during high-cost times
more than will Flat-Rate households.
To test the effect of the peak charge on household VMT within the UGB during the peak
hour, a difference-in-difference method21 was used. The basic premise of this method is to
examine the effect of a treatment by comparing the treatment group after treatment both
to the treatment group before treatment and to some other control group. Because many
factors may impact the participants during the treatment period, this method uses a control
group to eliminate the influence of the non-treatment factors, assuming that these other
factors were the same for the treatment and control groups.
The difference-in-difference method was used to control for any potential travel changes
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 caused by seasonal travel patterns. First, the changes
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 VMT were calculated for both the Flat-Rate and PeakCharged households. Second, the VMT change for both household types was compared
using the paired-difference method.
This analysis found that Peak-Charged households reduced their Portland Weekday
Peak VMT by an average of 1.46 miles more than did the Flat-Rate households (see
the first data row in Table 6). However, we wondered if this difference between the two
groups might be explained not by the different fee structures, but rather by the fact that
the Peak-Charged households had a higher average VMT in Phase 1. (Households were
not randomly assigned to the two groups, as explained in the previous chapter.) To control
for this effect, the sixth data column of Table 6 shows the percentage changes in VMT.
Looking at the change in miles driven as a percentage, rather than as an absolute number,
shows that the Peak-Charged households reduced their Portland Weekday Peak driving
by 30 percentage points more than did the Flat-Rate households.
In summary, the difference-in-difference analysis confirms Hypothesis 1. It shows that the
Peak-Charged households did, as expected, reduce their Portland Weekday Peak driving
more than did the Flat-Rate households. The reduction was 30 percentage points more for
Portland Weekday Peak miles, 9 percentage points more for Oregon Weekday miles, and
3 percentage points more for Overall miles. Charging a noticeably higher fee for driving
in congested conditions successfully achieved the goal of inducing households to reduce
their VMT in those times and places where congestion is most a problem.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Analysis and Findings

22
Table 6.

Change in Average Household Daily VMT per Vehicle, from Phase 1 to
Phase 2, Comparing Peak-Charged and Flat-Rate Households
Mean differencea in
change in average
daily VMT

Mean % difference
in average daily
VMT
Peak-Charged
– Flat-Rated
(percentage
points/p-value)

PeakChargedb
(miles)

FlatRatec
(miles)

Peak-Charged –
Flat-Rated
(miles / p-value)

PeakCharged
(miles)

FlatRate
(miles)

Portland Weekday
Peak

-1.1

0.7

-1.46 (0.00)

-13%

18%

-30 (0.00)

Portland Weekday
Off-Peak

-0.3

0.01

-0.34 (-0.61)

-2%

3%

-5 (0.28)

Oregon Low-Fee
Weekday

-2.6

-1.2

-1.34 (-0.16)

-10%

-4%

-5 (0.39)

Oregon Weekday

-3.6

-0.5

-2.79 (-0.01)

-11%

-1%

-9 (0.05)

Oregon Weekend

-16.9

-10.8

-5.18 (-0.04)

-28%

-27%

-1 (0.80)

Outside Oregon All
Days

-0.8

-1.1

-0.28 (-0.77)

56%

-28%

99 (0.30)

Overall

-6.4

-3.7

-3.03 (-0.05)

-15%

-12%

-3 (0.46)

Notes:
• Bold font indicates the difference is significant at the 5% level.
• The Peak-Charged households group has 68 observations, and the Flat-Rate households group has 62
observations
• See Table 4 and Table 5 for the VMT data used to create this table.
a
The difference is calculated first, and then the mean is derived.
b
Peak-Charged households, N=68. Difference calculated as Phase 2 – Phase 1.
c
Flat-Rate households, N=62.Difference calculated as Phase 2 – Phase 1.
d
This is the difference-in-difference calculated using the paired difference function in SPSS (the numbers are not the
direct difference between the first two columns in this table).

Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2: Peak-Charged households will increase travel in the off-peak time period,
and/or at all times outside the peak-charge zone, as compensation for reducing their
travel during the peak hour within the UGB (the peak-charge zone).
It is possible that the Peak-Charged households might compensate for reducing their
Portland Weekday Peak travel by increasing travel at other times. For example, households
might shift shopping trips from weekdays to weekends as a way to reduce mileage during
the peak hours. To test Hypothesis 2, four such possible spillover effects were checked:
increases in Portland Weekday Off-Peak, Oregon Low-Fee Weekday, Oregon Weekend,
and Outside Oregon All Days VMT.
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First, a check of Table 6 shows that there was no statistically significant increase in
Portland Weekday Off-Peak VMT or Oregon Low-Fee Weekday VMT. To confirm this
finding, we also compared (1) the expected reduction of Oregon Weekday VMT caused by
the reduction of the Portland Weekday Peak VMT with (2) the actual reduction of Oregon
Weekday VMT. The VMT data in Table 5 indicate that, for the Peak-Charged households,
the average Portland Weekday Peak VMT is 29% of the Oregon Weekday VMT in Phase 1
(8.6 miles / 30.0 miles). A 30% reduction in Portland Weekday Peak VMT equals an 8.7%
reduction in Oregon Weekday VMT (30% x 29%), which is the exact same reduction that
Table 6 shows for the change in Oregon Weekday VMT. It is thus reasonable to conclude
that the drop in observed Oregon Weekday VMT is caused entirely by the reduction of
Portland Weekday Peak VMT. Therefore, there are no spillover effects to off-peak hours
on Portland weekdays and to areas outside the Portland UGB.
The same process was used to check if there was spillover to the Oregon Weekend,
and Outside Oregon All Days VMT. The Oregon Weekday VMT accounts for about 65%
of the Overall VMT for the Peak-Charged households (Table 5). A 9% reduction would
result in a 5.8% reduction (65% x 9%) in Overall VMT. However, the actual Overall VMT
change is only a 3% reduction (and the change is statistically insignificant), suggesting
that the Oregon Weekday VMT reduction may be offset by increases in other VMT types.
For example, there is a large increase in Outside Oregon All Days VMT, though the
change is statistically insignificant and, so, inconclusive. One possible explanation for
the inconsistency is that Outside Oregon VMT has a large standard error in the change in
miles (2.4 miles) and Oregon Weekend VMT has a large standard error in the percentage
change (94%). Therefore, there might be a spillover effect for VMT on the weekends and
outside Oregon, but our data are unable to confirm this due to the small sample size and
a large variation in the data.
To conclude, the results do not confirm Hypothesis 2. There are no detected spillover effects
to off-peak hours or to areas outside the peak-charge zone. There could be spillover effects
to weekends and to areas outside the state of Oregon, but the result is not conclusive.
The lack of evident spillover to areas outside Oregon where no mileage fee was applied,
including just over the Columbia River to the state of Washington, makes sense given the
economics of the region. First, most of the region’s jobs are located within the Oregon part
of the region. Second, and perhaps more important in explaining off-peak and weekend
travel, the State of Oregon does not have a sales tax, while the State of Washington does.
Therefore, people living in Oregon have an economic disincentive to shop in Washington.

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN URBAN FORM AND THE MILEAGE FEE
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3: Given a sufficient incentive to reduce driving, households in dense, mixeduse, and transit-accessible neighborhoods are more likely to reduce their VMT than would
households in other types of neighborhoods.
In order to capture the interaction between the urban form and the mileage fee, we ran
regression models for each of the seven types of VMT. For each model, the dependent
variable is the change between Phase 1 and Phase 2 in average daily VMT per household
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vehicle. The models incorporate several types of likely causal factors as independent
variables: household attributes, measures of the urban form around a household’s
residential location, and the household’s average daily VMT per vehicle in Phase 1 for each
of the 7 VMT types (the “base” household VMT for each of the 7 types). The household
attributes include the number of vehicles owned, household size, employment status,
and income level. The urban form measures include the spatial location of the household
residence in the Portland metropolitan region (e.g., distance to downtown and distance to
the UGB), accessibility to public transit, and development density and land-use mix in the
neighborhood. The model on Outside Oregon All Days has one extra variable: the network
distance to the two bridges on the Columbia River that lead to the city of Vancouver in the
State of Washington. (Table 3 lists all the independent variables used.)
Table 7 presents the results of the 14 models: one model for each VMT type was run
for each of the two household types (the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households). All
models are the best specifications with the highest adjusted R2. Four urban form variables
were statistically insignificant and thus were excluded from all the results shown. These
final models were selected using a backward-delete process: the least significant variable
was excluded with each successive application of the model, until the adjusted R2 became
the highest. Comparing these results with the initial models that included all the variables
shows that the results are almost identical for both approaches to the modeling. Therefore,
only the reduced models in Table 7 are analyzed in the following discussion.
The overall explanatory power of the models ranges from an adjusted R2 of 0.039 to 0.561,
indicating that the included independent variables explain 4% to 56% of the variation in the
dependent variable (the change in VMT). The models were least successful at explaining
changes in weekday peak VMT within the Portland UGB.
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1.21

0.076

-9.08
0.101

-0.21

0.039

-12.5
0.269

-0.23

0.18

0.36

0.23

-1.52

0.220

-0.40

-16.2

-0.33

2.04

3.33

-3.99

0.242

-0.20

3.21

3.81

2.0

-4.27

2.04

9.22
2.92

FR

PC

Change in Oregon
Low-Fee Weekday
VMT

0.197

-0.24

-27.4

-0.33

-0.65

1.98

-4.97

0.242

-0.18

4.09

5.53

1.45

-6.56

3.41

FR

4.24

17.3

PC

Change in
Oregon
Weekday VMT

0.561

-0.54

-29.0

-1.08

-0.57

9.22

-5.92

-8.56

4.99

37.4

PC

0.442

-0.44

19.4

-0.48

-5.46

3.31

3.00

3.12

-5.97

0.59

FR

Change in
Oregon
Weekend VMT

0.263

-0.40

10.9

0.32

-2.02

2.71

-1.35

1.08

PC

0.333

-0.57

9.92

-0.22

-0.24

-0.39

-0.46

-1.99

-2.05

2.84

-2.86

FR

Change in
Outside Oregon
VMT

0.441

-0.40

-11.6

-0.62

-2.42

5.81

-4.13

19.5

PC

0.224

-0.26

13.9

4.20

4.75

3.20

2.37

-6.65

-3.47

FR

Overall Change
in VMT

Note:
• The dependent variable is the change between Phase 1 and Phase 2 in average daily VMT per household vehicle
• Italics with underlining indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. Bold indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. The other variables
are insignificant but had a t-statistic greater than 1.0 (in absolute value). Empty cells indicate the variable was included in the initial model but dropped out because its
t-statistic had an absolute value of less than 1.0. In other words, these variables were deleted from the final model because doing so produced a model with a higher
adjusted R2 value.
a
Peak-Charged households, n = 68.
b
Flat-Rate households, n = 62.

Adjusted R

2

Phase 1 VMT

Entropy index

Housing unit density

Gas station (miles)

Miles to UGB

0.22

1.97

Light rail (≤.5 mile)

Downtown (miles)

1.17

Income ≥$60k

Income [$40k−$60k]

3.24

3.76

1.89

-2.85

-2.75

FR

Children (yes/no)

0.91

1.06

-2.18

5.13

PC

1.69

0.84

0.60

-1.74

0.003

FRb

Change in Portland
Weekday Off-Peak
VMT

Part-time only

Full-time (yes/no)

# of adults

-0.15

1.39

Constant

# of vehicles

PCa

Change in
Portland Weekday Peak VMT

A Comparison of the Effect of Urban Form Factors on the Changes from Phase 1 to Phase 2 of the Average Daily
VMT per Household Vehicle (values shown are the coefficients from the final model specifications)

Independent Variables

Table 7.
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Portland Weekday Peak models
For the Peak-Charged households, the only urban form variable significant at the 5% level
is the Entropy Index, which measures land-use diversity. The negative sign indicates that
for these households, a mix of land uses helps to further reduce their VMT in peak hours in
Portland. (Note that the dependent variable here is the VMT change from Phase 1 to Phase
2.) By contrast, the only significant variable for the Flat-Rate households is accessibility to a
light rail station, and this is only significant at the 10% level. Surprisingly, the coefficient for
this variable has a positive sign. In other words, the closer a Flat-Rate household is situated
to a light rail station, the more it will drive—the opposite of our expectation.

Portland Weekday Off-Peak models
For the Peak-Charged households, the only significant urban form variable (at the 10%
level) is still the Entropy Index with a negative sign, the same pattern as in the Peak Portland
model. None of the urban form variables are significant for the Flat-Rate households. One
other variation between the two household types is that the density variable has opposite
signs for the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households, though neither one is significant at
the 10% level.

Oregon Low-Fee Weekday models
For the Peak-Charged households, two urban form variables are significant: housing unit
density (at the 5% level) and the Entropy Index (at the 10% level), both with a negative
sign. This suggests that density and mixed use could help households reduce VMT under
a mileage fee with a higher peak charge. For the Flat-Rate households, no urban form
variables were statistically significant in the final model specification.

Oregon Weekday models
For the Peak-Charged households, two variables are significant: density (at the 10% level)
and mixed use (at the 5% level). The coefficients for both have the expected signs. For FlatRate households, no variables are significant; in fact, none even remain in the final model.

Oregon Weekend models
For Peak-Charged households, density is significant at the 5% level with the expected
sign—households facing a penalty on driving will reduce VMT more if they live in a denser
neighborhood (the dependent variable is the VMT change from Phase 1 to Phase 2). For
Flat-Rate households, only the Entropy Index remains significant at the 10% level. The
coefficient has a positive sign, indicating that Flat-Rate households in areas with a higher
mix of land uses increase VMT more than Flat-Rate households living in neighborhoods
with less variation in land use. Note that the Entropy Index has opposite signs for Flat-Rate
and Peak-Charged households, though the latter is insignificant at the 10% level.
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Outside Oregon models
For the Peak-Charged households, the network distance to downtown is significant at
the 5% level with a positive sign. This suggests that, with a penalty for driving more,
households living farther away from the Portland downtown are more likely to drive across
the state border to avoid the penalty. The Entropy Index is significant at the 10% level with
a positive sign, suggesting that Flat-Rate households living in mixed-use neighborhoods
tend to increase their Outside Oregon All Days VMT more than other Flat-Rate households.
Note that the network distance to downtown again has opposite signs between Flat-Rate
and Peak-Charged households, though neither variable is significant.

Overall VMT models
For the Peak-Charged households, density is significant at the 5% level with an expected
sign; dense developments help households to further reduce their overall VMT when a
penalty is charged in peak hours in Portland. The Entropy Index coefficients have opposite
signs for the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households, though both of them are insignificant
at the 10% level.

Summary
In summary, the results confirm Hypothesis 3. They reveal that density and mixed-use
are often statistically significant, with a negative sign for Peak-Charged households. This
suggests that when the travel cost increases in peak hours in Portland, households living
in denser and mixed-use neighborhoods are able to reduce their VMT more than those not
living in these neighborhoods, possibly due to the alternative destinations available nearby
and the availability of alternative modes of travel.
However, the models also suggest that the urban form effects on Flat-Rate households
are totally different from those on Peak-Charged households. For a Flat-Rate household,
density and mixed-use tend to encourage, not discourage driving. A possible explanation
for this surprising finding—which contradicts the expectation that participants would reduce
VMT to save money on fees—is proposed at the end of the chapter.

Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4: Replacing the gas tax with a mileage fee reinforces the influence of urban
form on households’ travel patterns, perhaps because such a fee establishes a stronger
and more prominent connection between travel cost and travel distance than does a gas
tax.
To test this hypothesis, two types of models were developed: one with and one without
the urban form variables. The difference between the adjusted R2 values for each model
indicates how much the urban form variables contribute to explaining the variation in the
average daily VMT per household vehicle, among all households within that household
group. The two models are applied to all seven types of VMT for both types of households
(Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged) and for both time periods (Phase 1 and Phase 2).22 For
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comparison, the Phase 1 and Phase 2 models have the same structure. The VMT base
variable is not included in either model. Table 8 presents both the absolute contribution
made by the urban form variables (the difference in the adjusted R2 values), and also the
share (percent) of the contribution by the urban form variables (the difference between
the two adjusted R2 values divided by the adjusted R2 value for the model containing all
variables).
Table 8 summarizes the 56 values (2 households x 7 VMT types x 2 phases x 2 adjusted
R2 values = 56). For example, in Phase 2, adding the urban form variables adds a value
of 4 percentage points to the adjusted R2 for the model for Overall VMT for the FlatRate households, and these percentage points account for 22% of the overall variation
explained by the model with the urban form variables. The same values for the PeakCharged households are 14 percentage points and 49%, respectively.
Overall, adding the urban form variables improves the adjusted R2 values by 3 to 15
percentage points for the Flat-Rate households and generally a bit more (4 to 22 percentage
points) for the Peak-Charged households. (Note that the change in the adjusted R2 values
is higher for the Peak-Charged households in all but one of the 14 models.)
The difference-in-difference method is used to test the degree to which the urban form
variables explain the difference from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in average daily VMT per
household vehicle for the Peak-Charged versus the Flat-Rate households. The percentage
point difference in the adjusted R2 values between Phase 1 and 2 for the Flat-Rate
households is compared to the same values for the Peak-Charged households. Table 9
presents these 14 values. For example, for Overall VMT, the contribution that the urban
form variables make to explaining household VMT is 8.9 percentage points higher for
the Peak-Charged households than for the Flat-Rate households, while the share of the
urban form contribution (compared to the model with just the demographic and base VMT
variables) increases by 38.8 percentage points.
In summary, the findings mostly confirm Hypothesis 4. Table 9 suggests that the peak
charge enhances the influence of urban form on four of the seven types of household VMT
and reduces the influence of urban form on the other three, which are Portland Weekday
Off-Peak VMT, Oregon Low-Fee Weekday VMT, and Outside Oregon All Days VMT.
However, even for these three types of VMT, the influence of the urban form variables is
higher for the Peak-Charged households than for the Flat-Rate households.
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Contribution of Urban Form Variables to the Explained Variation in Average Daily Household VMT per Vehicle
Portland Portland
Oregon
Weekday Weekday Low-Fee Oregon
Oregon
Peak
Off-Peak Weekday Weekday Weekend

Outside
Oregon

Overall

P1a

P2b

P1

P2

P1

P2

P1

P2

P1

P2

P1

P2

P1

P2

10

3

5

3

9

4

11

5

5

3

8

15

12

4

30

10

51

10

82

27

55

20

19

14

100

61

58

22

16

14

9

6

18

11

22

20

4

7

22

12

12

14

53

59

71

50

91

84

77

74

22

37

68

93

47

49

Flat-Rate HHs
Absolutec
Shared (%)
Peak-Charged HHs
Absolute
Share (%)
a
b
c

d

Phase 1: Mid-June to mid-November, 2006.
Phase 2: Mid-November 2006 to mid-March 2007.
The absolute difference between the two adjusted R2 values – i.e., the R2 value of the first model minus the R2 value
of the second model.
The difference between the two adjusted R2 values, divided by the adjusted R2 value for the model containing all
variables.

Table 9.

Effect of the Peak-Charge Fee Design on the Urban Form Contribution to
Household VMT (in Percentage Points)a
Portland
Weekday
Peak

Change of
contribution
Change of
share of contribution
a

Portland
Weekday
Off-Peak

Oregon
Low-Fee
Weekday

4.1

-0.3

-1.1

3.7

5.1

-16.1

8.9

26.1

20.4

48.1

32.3

19.4

64.1

38.8

Oregon
Weekday

Oregon
Weekend

Outside
Oregon

Overall

The values expressed are the adjusted R2 values for the Peak-Charged households (Phase 1 - Phase 2) minus FlatRate households (Phase 1 - Phase 2).
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RETHINKING THE PROGRAM: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE MILEAGE
FEE PROGRAM’S COST STRUCTURE FOR PARTICIPANTS AND THE URBAN
FORM EFFECT
One key feature of the Portland pilot program was the establishment of an endowment
account for each enrolled vehicle, a common practice of pilot programs such as this. As
described earlier, the amount of money in the account was calculated by ODOT using a
formula based on the household’s VMT in Phase 1 and the fee structure in Phase 2. For
a Flat-Rate household, the account value was set as its total Oregon mileage in Phase 1
multiplied by 1.2 cents per mile. For a Peak-Charged household, the account value was
set as the sum of (1) the Portland Weekday Peak mileage in Phase 1 multiplied by 10
cents per mile and (2) all other miles driven in Oregon in Phase 1 multiplied by 0.43 cents
per mile. Therefore, if a household’s driving pattern remained the same in Phase 2 as in
Phase 1, the endowment account balance would approximately equal zero at the end
of Phase 2.23 The average amount of money deposited in the endowment accounts was
$51.50 for a Flat-Rate household and $123.20 for a Peak-Charged household.24
The program designers included the endowment account for two reasons. First, the
accounts provided a logistically simple way for participating households to pay the mileage
fee in Phase 2. Also, this element of the program design helped recruit participants by
ensuring that their participation wouldn’t cost them money out-of-pocket. Second, the
endowment accounts created an incentive for households to reduce their VMT in Phase 2.
If a household reduced VMT in Phase 2, any endowment balance remaining at the end
was granted to the household. Building such a financial incentive into the program was
important, since in Phase 2 the households were paying neither the mileage fee nor the
gas tax with their own money. During the program, ODOT notified participants of their
endowment balances every few weeks, giving them information that could help them
modify their driving habits in order to reduce the mileage fee charged to their account
balance and maximize their reward at the completion of the pilot program.25 However, if a
household drove more in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 and used up all the endowment account
money, it was not required to pay off this “debt.”26
Although the initial purpose of the endowment accounts was to provide a real-life incentive
for households to save money by driving a bit less, evaluations of the mileage fee program
have not tested whether households actually reacted as expected. Given the complex
cost structure of the Portland program, we suspected that this signal might be too weak or
ambiguous to effectively encourage households to reduce VMT.
Therefore, we decided to test the endowment-account effect by including the starting
value of each household’s endowment account as a variable in the seven VMT models
for both Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households and comparing the result with the
original models run without this variable. We found that the cost structure of the Portland
program, especially the endowment account feature, sent multiple signals to participating
households that, on balance, actually encouraged Flat-Rate households to increase their
average daily VMT per household vehicle in Phase 2, as compared to Phase 1, but had
little effect on Peak-Charged households.
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Evaluating the Effect of the Endowment Account
To test this hypothesis, four types of variables were tested in the seven VMT models:
household attributes, urban form measures, the household’s Phase 1 base VMT (average
daily VMT per household vehicle), and the value of the household’s endowment account
at the beginning of Phase 2. Model 1 includes the first three types of variables and Model
2 adds the endowment account variable. The regression results are summarized in
Table 10 for Flat-Rate households and in Table 11 for Peak-Charged households. Only
the estimations of the base VMT in Phase 1 and the endowment account variables are
presented in the tables.
Before analyzing the result, the relationship between the Phase 1 base VMT and the
endowment account should be clarified. First, including the base VMT is necessary to
control for the fact that the households were not randomly assigned to the Flat-Rate and
Peak-Charged groups; their assignment was based partly on their Phase 1 base VMT.
Second, we tested and confirmed that the base VMT and the endowment account are not
highly correlated. (There was no correlation because the mileage used to calculate the
endowment account money is not one of the seven types of mileage used for this study.27)
As Table 10 and Table 11 show, the endowment account proves insignificant in all the
models for the Peak-Charged Households. By contrast, for the Flat-Rate households the
endowment account variable is significant in the models for four types of VMT. In each
case the coefficient is positive, indicating that the endowment account money is associated
with driving more, not less, in Phase 2. For example, one extra dollar in the endowment
account is associated with an increase of 0.235 Overall VMT miles from Phase 1 to Phase
2 (Table 10, last column).
Another interesting observation about the Flat-Rate households is that when the endowment
account variable is included, the coefficient for the base VMT variable increases in absolute
value. This further proves that the base VMT and endowment account have opposite
effects on the dependent variable. The estimations of the base VMT in Model 2 capture
the real effect of seasonal VMT change while those in the Model 1, without the endowment
account, underestimate that effect. For example, for Overall VMT, Model 1 shows that a
Flat-Rate household normally would reduce average daily VMT by 0.256 miles in Phase
2 for each mile driven in Phase 1. However, Model 2 shows that this 0.256-mile drop is
actually caused by a reduction of 0.628 miles from each Phase 1 Base VMT mile (due to
the seasonal change), combined with an increase of 0.235 miles per dollar in the starting
value of the endowment account.
For a typical Flat-Rate household with the median overall daily VMT in Phase 1 (26.8
miles) and the median endowment account value ($45.2), about 63%28 of the seasonal
reduction in VMT that would otherwise be expected is offset by the growth in VMT induced
by the endowment account. In other words, a household’s Phase 2 VMT reduction would
be 63% greater if the endowment account were completely removed.
Further inspection of Table 10 shows that the effect of the endowment account varies among
the 7 different VMT models. Note that the endowment account variable is insignificant in
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two of the different VMT models (the Portland Weekday Peak and Portland Weekday OffPeak models), and only significant at the 10% level in the Oregon Weekday model. This
result suggests that the endowment account affects primarily non-commuting travel—i.e.,
travel outside Portland during the peak times, travel on weekends, and travel outside
Oregon. Such a finding makes intuitive sense; households most likely are traveling for
non-work purposes in these conditions, and trips for which the members likely have more
flexible travel schedules.
Finally, note that for Flat-Rate households, when the endowment account is significant,
the goodness-of-fit (adjusted R2) of the model improves dramatically—by an average of
30% compared to the models without the endowment account.

Behavioral Explanation
In order to understand the different behavioral responses from Flat-Rate and PeakCharged households, it is useful to look at how the money in their endowment accounts
was finally distributed between mileage fee payments and cash rewards to participants.
This analysis suggests how the participating households used the endowment money
(e.g., as a potential cash reward vs. as a fund for payment for VMT fee).
For the Flat-Rate households, the endowment account money was spent in two ways:
part of the money covered all the mileage fee charges the household accrued in Phase 2,
and the remainder was granted to the household at the end of Phase 2 as a cash reward
(Figure 3a). On average, 64% of the endowment account money was spent on the VMT
fee charges, and 36% went to the household as a cash reward.29

Cash Reward
(41%)

Cash Reward
(36%)
Mileage Charges
(64%)

Peak-Hour
Mileage Charges
(51%)

Low-Rate
Mileage Charges
(51%)

(a) Flat-Rate Households

(b) Peak-Charged Households

Figure 3. Average Distribution of Funds in the Endowment Accounts for Flat-Rate
and Peak-Charged Households
Source: Calculated by the authors using the mileage data provided by ODOT.
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For the Peak-Charged households, the endowment account money was divided among
three expenditures: the 10-cents-per-mile fee applied to all Portland Weekday Peak
mileage, the reduced mileage fee for all other Oregon mileage, and the cash reward to
participants (Figure 3b). The money was, on average, divided as follows: 51% covered
the peak-hour mileage charges, 8% covered the low-rate mileage charges, and 41% was
given to the household as a cash reward.
The average values for all households presented mask the fairly significant variation in
how the endowment account money was spent among households. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of the percent of endowment money spent paying mileage fee charges for
both Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households. In both groups, the majority of households
spent 50% to 80% of the money to pay mileage fee charges, but a few households spent
only 10% to 20%, and there were five households in each group that actually overspent
their endowment money (on average, 119% for the five Flat-Rate households and 113%
for the five Peak-Charged households). The great variation indicates that the assumption
that all households will treat the endowment account uniformly as an incentive to reduce
driving does not hold.
Flat-Rate Households (N=62)

Peak-Charged Households (N=68)

14
12
10
8
6

Frequency
4
2
0
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

-2

Percentage of Endowment Account Spent as Mileage Fee

Figure 4. The Distribution of the Share of Endowment Account Spent to Pay the
Mileage Fee for Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged Households
Given this vast difference in the usage of the endowment money, we assume that
participating households may not all view the money the same way. For example, for
a household that used only 10% of the money, this endowment account is more like a
cash reward for its VMT reduction. For a household that used 90% of the money to cover
mileage fees, the endowment account is more like a subsidy from the government to
cover gas tax costs. Although each household falls in a different place along this reward-
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Table 10. Effect of the Endowment Account on the Change in Average Daily Household VMT from Phase 1 to Phase 2, for
Flat-Rate Households (n=62)

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

Overall

2

Outside
Oregon

1

0.350

Oregon
Weekend

2

0.224

Oregon
Weekday

1

0.484

Oregon Low-Fee
Weekday

2

0.382

Portland Weekday
Off-Peak

1

0.553

Portland Weekday
Peak

Model

0.475

0.24
(3.4)

-0.63
(-4.7)

0.275

-0.26
(-3.1)

0.240

0.08
(3.3)

-0.79
(-6.4)

0.304

-0.64
(-5.1)

0.248

0.18
(3.2)

-0.64
(-6.8)

0.269

-0.45
(-5.6)

0.269

0.09
(1.9)

-0.33
(-2.9)

0.085
-0.17
(-2.2)

0.138

0.08
(2.3)

-0.32
(-3.2)

Adj. R2
-0.17
(-2.1)

-0.21
(-2.8 b)
0.02
(1.0)

-0.25
(-3.0)


-0.003
(-0.03)

a

Base VMT
Phase 1
$ Endowc

Note: Model 1 and Model 2 differ only in that Model 2 includes the amount of the household’s endowment account at the beginning of Phase 2. Both models include
household demographic variables, the base (average daily) VMT from Phase 2, and urban form variables. Numbers in bold indicate the variable was significant at the 0.05
level.
a
Indicates
the variable has a t-statistic smaller than 1, and so was not included in the final model specification.
b
Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.
Value of the endowment account at the beginning of Phase 2.
c
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-0.04
(-1.6)

-0.51
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Oregon
Weekend

-0.54
(-8.8b)
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1
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Oregon





2
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0.02
(1.2)

-0.41
(-5.7)

0.447

Overall

-0.40
(-6.5)
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1

Table 11. Effect of the Endowment Account on the Change in Average Daily Household VMT from Phase 1 to Phase 2, for
Peak-Charged Households (n=68)

Model
Adj. R2
Base VMT
Phase 1
$ Endowc

Note: Model 1 and Model 2 differ only in that Model 2 includes the amount of the household’s endowment account at the beginning of Phase 2. Both models include
household demographic variables, the base (average daily) VMT from Phase 2, and urban form variables. Numbers in bold indicate that the variable was significant at the
0.05 level.
a
Indicates that the variable has a t-statistic smaller than 1. and so was not included in the final model specification.
b
Numbers in parentheses are t–statistics.
Value of the endowment account at the beginning of Phase 2.
c
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to-subsidy spectrum, there is a clear difference between the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged
households.
For the Flat-Rate households, the majority of the endowment account money (64%) was
used to pay a mileage fee, a replacement for the gas tax. All participating households
were informed that the fee was set up as equivalent to the gas tax—they would not pay
more money under the new fee scheme. This payment was provided by the government
at no cost to the participating households, effectively lowering the price of gas for them.
It is likely that the lowered gas prices proved a more salient financial incentive for
participants than did the potential to keep unspent money from the endowment account.
When households do not need to pay the gas tax at the pump, this provides a direct and
immediate savings. And this price reduction was not minor. In Oregon, the state gas tax
is 24 cents per gallon, while the average gas price in the West Coast in Phase 2 was
$2.51 per gallon30. Therefore, all Flat-Rate participants enjoyed a 9.6% reduction in the
price they paid at the pump during Phase 2. At the same time, the potential “cash reward”
from the endowment account was likely much less salient and visible to the participants.
Participants could not check the account balance by themselves, and the “reward” money
they received if they reduced their VMT was available only at some unknown (to them)
future date, after the program ended. Finally, even if households thought directly about the
cost of the mileage fee when making travel decisions, the rate of 1.2 cents per mile most
likely sounded too trivial to provide a clear incentive to reduce VMT.
The salience of price on consumer behavior has been well documented in the behavioral
economics literature. For example, Chetty et al. found that consumption decreases
substantially when sales tax is included in the displayed price, even though consumers
would pay the same total price either way. The authors ran an experiment using 750
distinct products at a supermarket in Northern California over a three-week period, with a
state sales tax of 7.375%. Consumers spent 8% less when the price tags showed the final
price, including sales tax.31
The findings from the modeling appear to contradict the assumption by the program
designers that the endowment account should not have impacted household VMT at all.
As the modeling indicates, the endowment accounts did influence behavior, although the
direction of the effect is counterintuitive (the larger the endowment account and potential
cash reward, the greater the household’s VMT). This apparent contradiction between the
modeling results and the assumption can be explained by reexamining what the endowment
account variable actually represents. We suspect the endowment account variable was
significant because it served as a proxy for the household’s savings in expenditures on
gasoline during Phase 2, not because households were influenced by the prospect of
receiving money left in the endowment account itself. In other words, the variable probably
should be relabeled along the lines of “Potential Savings in Gasoline Expenditures.”
This reasoning, which could explain the behavior of the flat rate households, does not
work for the Peak-Charged households. The modeling results show the latter to be
uninfluenced by the endowment account variable (or its counterpart, the savings in gas
expenditures). Why might this be? First, about half (51%) of the endowment money was
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spent on a congestion charge, a price nine times higher than the gas tax in Phase 1. This
congestion charge also accounts for 86% (51% / 59% = 0.86) of all endowment money
spent on mileage fee charges. While Peak-Charged households still paid no gas tax at the
pump, it was probably hard for them to view the endowment money spent on the mileage
fee as a replacement for the gas tax. Instead, they probably perceived the endowment
account money spent on peak-charged VMT as a penalty on driving, an incentive which
might be as salient as the direct savings at the pump. This reasoning may explain why the
endowment account variable is insignificant for Peak-Charged households in Table 10.
Most models (five out of seven) do not even have the variable in the final specification,
and when they do, the coefficients show opposite signs, indicating that the endowment
account had no apparent influence on driving behavior.
In summary, by artificially lowering the cost of gas, the cost structure of the Portland
program may have encouraged Flat-Rate households to increase their VMT in Phase 2.
This suggests that the program results underestimated the effect of a flat-rate mileage fee
on VMT reduction. Based on our analysis, the reduction could have been 63% greater for
Flat-Rate households if the mileage fees had been incorporated into the price of gasoline
paid at the pump.32 The same underestimation may have occurred with Peak-Charged
households, but we are unable to detect it due to the mixed effects of the reduced gas
price at the pump and the high congestion charge.
This result also sheds light on the likely effects that could be expected from an actual
statewide or national mileage fee. First, because households would pay the mileage fee
with their own money, a real program should lead to a larger VMT reduction than that
observed in the Portland program, under either a flat-rate or variable-charged rate scheme.
Second, if the mileage fee is not paid at the pump and is paid only infrequently—for
example, once per month—the mileage-fee program may inadvertently encourage people
to drive more, since the gas price reduction at the pump may prove a stronger incentive
than the charges paid a month later with a credit card. The timing of payment is thus a key
issue in determining the how a mileage fee program will impact overall VMT.
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SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
A key finding is that the mileage fee program led some households to reduce their overall
VMT. The results showed significant VMT reductions in Portland Weekday Peak and
Oregon Weekday VMT. There appears to have been no corresponding spillover effects to
Portland Weekday Off-Peak or Oregon Low-Fee Weekday VMT. The lack of compensating
spillover travel may be explained by multiple factors. For example, the UGB in Portland
has prevented most development from occurring outside the congestion charge zone, so
there are few substitutive destinations outside the UGB, at least within Oregon. Without
the UGB, the likelihood of a spillover effect might have been greater. A second possibility is
that people’s travel schedules are less flexible on weekdays, making it impractical for them
to increase weekday off-peak travel to compensate for reduced peak-hour travel. Finally,
the analysis was unable to draw any conclusions about whether there were any spillover
increases in Oregon Weekend and Outside Oregon VMT.
Second, the analysis also provides evidence that a mileage fee with a variable rate could
potentially strengthen the interaction between urban form and travel decisions. The urban
form measures were more influential in explaining household VMT for the households
charged a variable mileage-fee than for households charged a flat-rate fee. This finding
about the impact of the urban form variables held for the results measured both in
absolute miles and percentage terms. Those Peak-Charged households located in denser
neighborhoods with a mix of land uses reduced VMT more than Peak-Charged households
located in other types of neighborhoods. For the Flat-Rate households, however, the
opposite occurred: those households in higher density, mixed-use neighborhoods actually
increased their VMT after the mileage fee was introduced.
A last significant finding is that the program design seems to have sent conflicting incentives
to the participating households in terms of whether they should increase or reduce VMT in
Phase 2. We suspect that the elimination of gas taxes from the price of gas encouraged FlatRate households to drive more instead of less because gas essentially become cheaper.
Such an effect disappears for Peak-Charged households, however, perhaps because the
high rate of the peak-hour mileage charge proved such a strong stimulus to reduce driving
that it outweighed the incentive provided by the lower gas prices to drive more. The effect
of the program design might help explain the unexpected findings that density and mixed
uses were associated with increased VMT for the Flat-Rate households.
The findings presented in this report are somewhat, but not entirely, consistent with those
of Rufolo and Kimpel’s analyses of the Oregon Mileage Fee program,33 though it is not
possible to make a direct comparison because of differences in research design. First,
Rufolo and Kimpel also did not find any spillover (increase) of VMT to off-peak hours.
Rather, they actually found a further decrease of VMT in off-peak hours. Second, they found
that access to public transit as measured by the network distance to frequently served
bus stops affected VMT changes, which complements our findings about the influence of
urban form variables.34 While we did not find any significant associations between transit
proximity and reduced VMT, we did see a relationship with density and mixed land uses.
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Transit service is generally higher in areas of higher density, which makes the finding
consistent with Rufolo and Kimpel.

LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY
When considering the findings from the study, it is important to keep in mind the limitations
of the data. The participants were not randomly selected, and the sample size was
relatively small. However, we believe these limitations are likely irrelevant to our analysis
for several reasons. First, we compared two groups of households within the sample, rather
than comparing the sample with the general population. Second, we see no compelling
theoretical argument for why the urban form effect should be correlated to people’s decision
to participate in the program. Only a few people mentioned environmental concerns as the
reason they participated in the program, while most listed money, curiosity, and the dislike
of gas taxes as main reasons to participate. Third, there is no obvious reason why the
general population would respond differently to the financial incentives set up in the pilot
program through the endowment account and the elimination of the gas tax. In sum, the
study findings seem likely to hold for the general population, though that conclusion would
need to be confirmed with additional research, particularly with data from a program that
overcomes some of these limitations.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The study results suggest several implications for transportation policymakers. First
and foremost, charging a noticeably higher fee for driving in congested conditions can
successfully motivate households to reduce their VMT in those times and places where
congestion is most a problem.
Second, the spillover effect of a variable charge might be less than expected. The study
found no evident spillover of VMT to off-peak hours on a weekday, perhaps indicating
that households are relatively unwilling to change their weekday travel patterns . The
study also found no spillover of VMT to the areas outside the peak-charged zone, though
this finding might be unique to the Portland metropolitan area because its UGB has kept
most development out of the land surrounding the metro region. Without such a boundary,
spillover to outside areas might be more likely to occur.
Third, in terms of the connection between urban form, the mileage fee, and travel behavior,
households in all types of neighborhoods will likely reduce their peak-hour and overall
travel under a charging scheme that charges a high-rate for peak-hour travel, though
households in higher-density neighborhoods with a mix of land uses will likely make greater
reductions in VMT.
Fourth, the study findings suggest that a mileage fee program that charges a high rate
during the peak hour will likely strengthen the underlying influence of urban form on travel
behavior as compared to the current gas tax system. In other words, urban form patterns
will affect travel behavior more than they currently do if the nation shifts to a new system
of mileage charges that vary by congestion levels. For planners, this finding suggests that
switching from fuel taxes to mileage taxes would strengthen the power of land-use planning
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as a policy tool to shift some travel from solo driving trips to more sustainable modes.
Also, this finding about the link between urban form and travel behavior in response to
a mileage fee implies that mileage-fee program designers will need to carefully consider
both current and future urban form patterns when estimating the likely revenues collected
from mileage fees and also the potential impact of the fees on congestion levels.
Fifth, the study findings suggest that residents in lower-density suburban areas, as well as
residents in higher-density and more mixed-use neighborhoods, are able to reduce their
driving in response to a mileage fee. Therefore, the results add new empirical evidence to
the ongoing equity debate about whether mileage fees are unfair to households living in
suburban communities and suggests that this concern may not be warranted. However,
none of the study’s households lived in rural areas, and Portland’s UGB may result in
higher suburban densities than those found in other metropolitan regions. Therefore, the
applicability of the findings with respect to geographical equity is somewhat limited.
Sixth, although a peak-hour mileage charge could encourage drivers to think carefully about
their travel decisions and they would probably reduce their VMT accordingly, the ultimate
program impacts on VMT will likely depend on the specific program design, especially the
timing of the mileage fee payment. If drivers pay mileage fees less frequently than they
currently pay gas taxes at the pump—e.g., if they’re billed monthly—they may increase
instead of decrease their VMT. Policymakers will want to pay attention to the psychological
aspects of the program design in order to best achieve their policy goals.
Seventh, these findings about the program design suggest that the results of the Portland
pilot program may have underestimated the effect of a mileage fee on VMT reduction. If
the mileage fee had been added to the price of the gas at the pump rather than billed later,
participants might have reduced their VMT more.
Finally, the analysis of the program design’s incentives may explain the apparently
“inconsistent” impact of the urban form variables on the behavior of the Flat-Rate and
Peak-Charged households in Hypothesis 3. This analysis found that some of the urban
form variables (density, transit access, and mixed land use) had an unexpected positive
coefficient for Flat-Rate households, though the positive coefficients are insignificant at
the 10% level in all models except for the Oregon Weekend one. Although the evidence is
not strong, these results suggest that with the incentive to drive more provided by a drop
in gas prices, households in denser, mixed-use, and transit-accessible neighborhoods
might increase their VMT more than would households in other types of neighborhoods.
Theoretically, this argument is actually consistent with Hypothesis 3: if households in
dense and transit-accessible areas are more elastic to travel cost than those who live in
lower-density neighborhoods without good transit service, then the former households
should reduce VMT more when travel cost increases and also increase VMT more when
travel cost decreases. Further analysis is necessary to test this hypothesis.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In terms of future research, two issues need to be analyzed to better understand the
effectiveness of a mileage-base fee program. The first is the behavioral analysis related
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to the endowment account. Such an analysis should cover both objective usage and
subjective perception of the endowment money. The Oregon pilot program dataset is
unable to support such analysis. A second issue for further research is the potential for
spillover VMT on weekends and/or outside the zone where the mileage fee is charged. This
research could neither prove nor disprove spillover in these latter cases due to limitation
of the data—the sample size is too small. However, this issue is critical to understanding
the overall effect on VMT that could be expected from a mileage fee program that was
applied at any geographical scale other than nationwide. Finally, testing a mileage fee in
other geographic areas, including rural ones, would help further address questions about
equity impacts.
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=

10.62 miles
16.83 miles

= 0.63
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Endnotes

29. Source: Calculated by the authors based on the household VMT data collected by
ODOT.
30. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Retail Gasoline Historical Price. Available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html
31. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft, “Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence,” American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (2009): 1145-1177.
32. This value is significantly higher than the typical gas price elasticity found in other
studies, though this value is not exactly elasticity. For example, Hughes et al. found
that gas price elasticity ranged from -0.034 to -0.077 during 2001 and 2006. We
suggest two possible explanations. First, the participants in this program may not
be representative of the general population. Monetary compensation was mentioned
as one of the major reasons why they participated in this pilot study. They might be
more sensitive to price. Second, we suspect that perhaps the elimination of gas tax
posed an additional incentive beyond the mere price reduction, though we do not have
evidence to support the argument.
33. Anthony M. Rufolo and Thomas J. Kimpel, “Responses to Oregon’s Experiment in
Road Pricing,” Transportation Research Record 2079 (2008), 159-166; Anthony M.
Rufolo and Thomas J. Kimpel, “Transit’s Effect on Mileage Responses to Oregon’s
Experiment in Road Pricing,” Transportation Research Record 2115 (2009): 60-65.
34. There are three key differences in research design. First, for this report the unit of
analysis is the average VMT per vehicle for each household, whereas Rufolo and
Kimpel’s studies looked at average VMT per individual vehicle. Second, this study
analyzed the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households in separate models, while
Rufolo and Kimpel combined them together with dummy variables of groups. Third,
Rufolo and Kimpel compared Phase 1 and Phase 2 to identify the program effect, while
this study compared the difference between Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged household
to identify the effect of peak charge.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
DOE

Department of Energy

FR

Flat-Rate

GPS

Global Positioning System

HH

Household

ODOT

Oregon Department of Transportation

P1

Phase 1

P2

Phase 2

PC

Peak-Charged

RLIS

Regional Land Information System

UGB

Urban Growth Boundary

VMT

Vehicle Miles Traveled
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
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